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Quantum key distribution can be performed with practical signal sources such as weak coherent
pulses. One example of such a scheme is the Bennett-Brassard protocol that can be implemented
via polarization of the signals, or equivalent signals. It turns out that the most powerful tool at the
disposition of an eavesdropper is the photon-number splitting attack. We show that this attack can
be extended in the relevant parameter regime such as to preserve the Poissonian photon number
distribution of the combination of the signal source and the lossy channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows to generate
a long secret shared key between two parties, conven-
tionally named Alice and Bob, from a short initial secret
key. Part of that newly generated key can then be used
up by sending an unconditionally secure secret message
via the one-time pad, also called Vernam cipher [1]. The
remaining part is retained to repeat the QKD protocol
to generate new key. The first complete protocol is that
by Bennett and Brassard, BB84 [2], although Wiesner
formulated basic ideas earlier [3].
In idealQKD protocols we are required to use particu-
lar states for which the preparation is beyond our present
experimental capability, such as single photon states on
which we can imprint signals in form of specific polar-
izations. For example, for the BB84 protocol we would
use two pairs of orthogonal polarizations, e.g. horizon-
tal/vertical linear polarization and right/left circular po-
larization.
Recently it has been proven that one can use real-
istic signal sources such as weak laser pulses polarized
in the four signal polarizations to perform QKD even
in the presence of loss and noise in the quantum chan-
nel. Indeed, in most experiments demonstrating the tech-
nique required for QKD this signal source has been used
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. For eavesdropping attacks on such sig-
nals, the security of the BB84 protocol in a realistic set-
ting has been explored regarding attacks on individual
signals in [10]. The proof of unconditionally security of
QKD with the BB84 protocol in this framework has been
presented in [11]. It turns out, that the combination of
multi-photon signals of the source, such as weak laser
pulses, together with loss in the quantum channel in the
presence of errors leads to limitations of rate and distance
that can be covered by those techniques. These restric-
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tions are due not only to the proving techniques but are
of fundamental nature [12], at least in a conservative ap-
proach to security where all errors and losses are assumed
to be due to eavesdropping activity.
The limitation comes from the fact that the combina-
tion of multi-photon signals of the source and loss in the
transmission line opens the door for a powerful eaves-
dropping attack, the Photon Number Splitting (PNS)
attack that was first mentionend in [13]. The basic step
is that a signal consisting of two or more photons (multi-
photon signal) can be split via a physical interaction [10]
by an eavesdropper (called Eve) such that Eve retains
one photon and Bob receives the other photons such that
the polarization of both parts remains undisturbed. The
photon in Eve’s hand will reveal its signal polarization to
Eve if she waits long enough until she learns the polariza-
tion basis during the public discussion part of the BB84
protocol. In the presence of loss, this attack can put Eve
in a position that she knows the complete information
about all signals received by Bob and no secure key can
be generated. This is the case if the loss is strong enough,
such that Bob expects to receive less signals than the sig-
nal source prepares multi-photon signals. Then Eve can
replace the lossy quantum channel by an ideal one, block
all single-photon signals and use only multi-photon sig-
nal to match Bob’s expectation of non-vacuum pulses. If
the loss is not high enough for this, then Eve can block
only a fraction b of the single-photon signals, but she
can perform some optimal eavesdropping attack on the
remaining single-photon pulses. This constitutes her op-
timal attack [10]. Despite this powerful attack, in this
situation, if the error rate is not too high, Alice and Bob
can establish a secure key, as has been shown in [10, 11],
in the standard BB84 protocol where no photon-number
statistics is monitored. Note that the PNS attack can be
well approximated with linear optics only [14].
One remaining open question is whether Alice and Bob
might be able to detect that Eve performed the PNS at-
tack. After all, the photon number statistics changes
under the PNS attack as described above. In this paper,
2we will show that is is possible to extend the PNS at-
tack such that the photon number statistics, as seen by
Bob, is indistinguishable from that resulting from weak
laser pulses and a lossy channel. This result holds in the
relevant paramter regime of mean photon number µ of
the Poissonian photon number distribution of the weak
laser pulse and of the transmission factor η of the quan-
tum channel. The extension of the PNS attack allows the
eavesdropper to remain undetected even if Alice and Bob
measure the photon number distribution via coincidence
rates in Bob’s photodetectors.
II. EXTENDED PNS ATTACK
We consider a photon source emitting signals with a
Poissonian photon number distribution with mean value
µ. Weak laser pulses are well described by Fock states
with this photon number distribution, but our analysis
can be extended to other distributions. The quantum
channel is described by a single-photon transmission ef-
ficiency η. Then we find at Bob’s end of the quantum
channel again a Poissonian photon number distribution
with mean photon number µη, that is
Ploss[n] =
(ηµ)n
n!
exp[−ηµ] . (1)
On the other hand, the PNS attack described above will
give another photon number statistics. Let Eve perform
the photon number splitting attack in which she blocks
a fraction b of the single-photon signals. Then we find a
resulting photon number distribution that is not Poisso-
nian, namely
PPNS [n] =


(1 + bµ) exp[−µ] n = 0(
(1− b)µ+ µ2/2
)
exp[−µ] n = 1
µn+1
(n+1)! exp[−µ] n > 1
(2)
To match the number of vacuum signals, we adjust b such
that Ploss[0] = PPNS [0]. This leads to the expression
bmatch =
1
µ
(exp[µ(1− η)]− 1) . (3)
We find bmatch = 0 for η = 1, while bmatch = 1 for
η = 1− 1
µ
ln[1+µ]. This last point corresponds precisely
to the situation where 1−Ploss[0] = 1− (1+ µ) exp[−µ],
that is, the number of non-vacuum signals arriving at the
end of the lossy quantum channel is equal to the number
of multi-photon signals emanating from the source. For
values of η between these two extreme values, b takes on
values in the interval (0, 1), and this is the regime we are
dealing with.
With this choice the photon number distribution after
Eve’s attack takes the form
Pmatch[n] =


exp[−ηµ] n = 0
(1 + µ+ µ2/2) exp[−µ]− exp[−ηµ] n = 1
µn+1
(n+1)! exp[−µ] n > 1 .
(4)
This photon number distribution is not Poissonian. The
question is whether Eve can make it Poissonian with-
out loosing any advantage of the PNS attack. It is easy
to come up with a possible solution: Eve can extract
not only one, but two or more photons from pulses de-
pending on the photon number in each pulse. With this
method it is possible to redistribute probabilities from
higher to lower photon numbers, but not the other way
round. Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition
for the redistribution to be possible is that
n∑
i=0
Ploss[i] ≥
n∑
i=0
Pmatch[i] (5)
is satisfied for all n. This condition that the change of
probability from any high-photon number part to a low-
photon number part goes in the right direction.
In order to work as an eavesdropping attack, we need
to make sure that the number of non-vacuum signals re-
mains unchanged. Indeed, in our extended strategy we
will never take ’the last photon’ out of a pulse, so the
number of non-vacuum signals does not change. This
guarantees that the information gain by Eve on the sig-
nals remains unchanged. The only change is that of the
photon number statistics of the signals arriving at Bob’s
end of the quantum channel.
III. EVALUATION OF EXTENDED PNS
ATTACK
In this section we will show that the conditions (5) is
satisfied in a parameter regime that we will show in the
following section to be relevant to practical QKD. Thus
we show that Eve can mimic Poissonian photon number
distribution even while performing the PNS attack via
our extension.
We define the dn as the difference of the two probability
distributions for given n, so that we have
dn = Pmatch[n]− Ploss[n] . (6)
Note that d0 = 0 due to the matching via the blocking
parameter b. We will show that in a relevant paramter
regime we find that dn ≤ 0 for n ∈ [1, nl] and dn ≥ 0 for
n ∈ [nl + 1,∞]. This is sufficient (though not necessary)
to fulfill the conditions (5). With other words, with in-
creasing value of n, the difference dn vanishes for n = 0,
then takes negative values until for n ≥ nl + 1 it turns
positive.
Let us first show by induction that once the function
turned positive, it will not turn back negative for n ≥ 2
and the parameter regime η ≤ 3/4. Assume that dn ≥ 0
for n ≥ 2. This means
µn+1
(n+ 1)!
exp[−µ] ≥
(ηµ)n
n!
exp[−ηµ] . (7)
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FIG. 1: As a function of the mean photon number µ and the
transmission efficiency η we see the area (grey shade) where
the original PNS attack yields less single photon signals than
the corresponding lossy channel. In this region the extended
PNS attack is successful in that it mimics the lossy channel
not only in the fraction of non-vacuum signals but also in the
whole photon number statistics.
Then it follows that
dn+1 (8)
=
µn+1
(n+ 1)!
exp[−µ]
µ
n+ 2
−
(ηµ)n
n!
exp[−ηµ]
µη
n+ 1
≥
(ηµ)n
n!
exp[−ηµ]
(
µ
n+ 2
−
µη
n+ 1
)
≥ 0 for η ≤
3
4
.
We do not need to prove directly that there is some dnl ≥
0 with nl ≥ 2. Instead, we will show that in a suitable
parameter regime d1 ≤ 0. That proves together with the
normalization
∑
∞
n=0 dn = 0 and d0 = 0 that there must
be some positive dn for n ≥ 2. With other words, for η <
3/4 we find that d1 ≤ 0 is a sufficient condition to allow
a redistribution of the photon number distribution after
the PNS attack to make it Poissonain without changing
the flow of information between the parties.
The required condition d1 ≤ 0 can be analyzed numer-
ically only. It is given after a regrouping as
(1 + µ+ µ2/2) exp[−µ]− (1 + ηµ) exp[−ηµ] ≤ 0 . (9)
The first term describes the fraction of signals containing
0 or 1 photons after the original PNS attack while the
second term describes the target value for this fraction.
Note that we fixed the fraction of vacuum signals so that
this is, indeed, a statement about the fraction of single-
photon signals. The region where d1 is negative is plotted
in figure 1.
The borderline shown in figure 1 can be evaluated more
closely in the typical regime were µ, η ≪ 1. If we expand
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FIG. 2: We compare the approximation (dashed line) for
the critical value η0 for which d1 vanishes with a numerical
solution of d1[η0] = 0 (solid line).
d1 in µ, η and neglect terms η
kµl with k+ l > 4, then we
obtain
d1 ≈ µ
2/2
(
−µ/3 + µ2/4 + η2
)
(10)
so that we find that the value η0 for which d1 vanishes
can be approximated by
η0 ≈
√
µ/3− µ2/4 (11)
As we see from Fig. 2, this is a good approximation for
low photon numbers. Note that the lowest order of the
approximation (10) is given by d1 ≈ −µ
3/6 which guar-
antees that the extended PNS attack is always successful
as long as µ and η are small. This is mirrored in the in-
finitely steep rise of the limiting line shown in figure 2.
IV. APPLICATION TO SECURITY PROOFS
AND DISCUSSION
From the security proofs [10, 11] we know the optimal
choice of the mean photon number µ from the point of
view of Alice and Bob. This optimization can be under-
stood starting from the idea that Alice and Bob would
like to optimize the gain rate of the QKD process. This
gain rate G is bounded in a conservative scenario from
above as G ≤ 12 (Sm − pexp) with Sm as the multi-photon
probability of the source and pexp as the fraction of non-
vacuum signals detected by Bob. The factor 1/2 comes
from a sifting state of the QKD protocol and is specific
for the BB84 protocol. For other polarization based pro-
tocols such as the six-state protocol [15] we find other fac-
tors, however, the reasoning is independent of this factor.
For our Poissonian distributed signals, we find
1
2
(Sm − pexp) =
1
2
(exp[−µη]− (1 + µ) exp[−µ]) (12)
and this expression is optimized for small values of η by
µopt ≈ η. As it turns out, that value remains approxi-
mately optimal in a detailed analysis taking other error
4sources into account [10, 11]. In typical experiments we
find that even higher photon numbers than the optimal
ones are used. That pushes the working point even fur-
ther away from the critical line in figure 1.
The statements above are made for a conservative sce-
nario where all loss and all errors are attributed to Eve.
It will be desirable to extend this analysis by making as-
sumptions stating that Eve cannot change the dark count
rate of Bob’s detectors and cannot increase the detection
efficiency. It turns out that this extension is not trivial
at all. The analysis in our paper, however, puts some
bounds on the results of such an analysis. Once Eve can
perform an extended PNS attack such that her action
mimics a lossy quantum channel both in the transmis-
sion efficiency and the Poissonian photon number statis-
tics, and she can block all single-photon signals, then the
transmission cannot be secure.
At the heart of our paper is the statement that stochas-
tic processes such as loss in a quantum channel can be ex-
plained by a rather cunning strategy of a third party, for
example an eavesdropper. It means that the eavesdrop-
per can access some preferred signals while suppressing
others such that the resulting action is indistinguishable
even in principle from a normal lossy channel for given
input signals. It is unclear so far what input signals have
to be chosen to make such a situation impossible.
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